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Strategy First
Results: 1036

#	Item
381	Superstition and Rational Learning1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed]Abstract: We argue that some but not all superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2005-07-18 17:35:40 Nash equilibrium Subgame Strategy Information set Bayesian game Game theory Extensive-form game Solution concept
382	REQUEST FOR EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST National Festivals Strategy: first stage research and options development This document is available until the closing date. Issue Date: Add to Reading List Source URL: www.australiacouncil.gov.au Language: English - Date: 2015-02-15 22:23:19 Request for tender Freedom of information legislation Privacy Ethics Government Procurement
383	Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium1 First version: April 25, 1995 This revision: July 12, 1999 Eddie Dekel Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 1999-07-12 13:09:31 Solution concept Nash equilibrium Outcome Rationalizability Normal-form game Strategic dominance Strategy Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Information set Game theory Extensive-form game Self-confirming equilibrium
384	When is Reputation Bad?1 Jeffrey Ely Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2 First Version: April 22, 2002 This Version: November 20, 2005 Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2005-11-21 14:01:27 Nash equilibrium Outcome Best response Normal-form game Repeated game Strategy Bayesian game Risk dominance Game theory Problem solving Extensive-form game
385	Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed] Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2007-05-29 08:07:41 Outcome Strategy Normal-form game Repeated game Risk dominance Game theory Problem solving Nash equilibrium
386	Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population1 David K. Levine and Wolfgang Pesendorfer2 First version: September 29, 1999 This version: May 10, 2000 Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2000-05-10 11:49:25 Nash equilibrium Science Strategy Risk dominance Best response Continuous game Evolutionary game theory Game theory Problem solving Economics
387	Learning and Equilibrium Drew Fudenberg* and David K. Levine First version: June 9, 2008 This version: August 30, 2008 Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2008-08-31 09:53:22** Fictitious play Best response Nash equilibrium Solution concept Extensive-form game Peyton Young Strategy Evolutionary game theory Outcome Game theory Problem solving Economics
388	Repeated Games with Frequent Signals Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine1 Departments of Economics, Harvard University and Washington University in St. Louis First Version: February 6, 2007 Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2008-06-02 12:42:51 Continuous function Strategy Outcome Mathematics Game theory Problem solving Nash equilibrium
389	Deterrence in the Cold War and the “War on Terror”1 David K. Levine Robert A. Levine2 First Version: January 23, 2006 This Version: September 1, 2005 Add to Reading List Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu Language: English - Date: 2006-03-28 14:35:32 Nuclear warfare Cold War Military strategy International relations theory Deterrence theory Flexible response Massive retaliation Deterrence Herman Kahn Military science Nuclear strategies International relations
390	3 November 2014 “EVENTS FIRST” STRATEGY Tim Cobbold CEO Add to Reading List Source URL: www.ubm.com Language: English - Date: 2014-11-10 12:59:57 Compound annual growth rate Money PR Newswire Informa Hewlett-Packard Technology Computing Computer hardware Actuarial science

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